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ARGUMENT 
I. This Court Should Hear the Mojo Plaintiffs' Appeal because They 
Intended to Appeal the District Court's Summary Judgment Ruling 
and Have Substantially Followed the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure states, "[a]n appeal may be taken 
from a district or juvenile court to the appellate court with jurisdiction over the appeal 
from all final orders and judgments ... by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the 
trial court within the time allowed by Rule 4." Id. at 3(a) (2011). Rule 4 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure states, "the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be 
filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment 
or order appealed from." Id. at 4(a). 
A. The Fredrickson Defendants Failed to Raise the Issue of an 
Untimely Appeal and, Therefore, Any Argument is Waived. 
The Fredrickson Defendants argue the Mojo Plaintiffs failed to file a timely Notice 
of Appeal and, therefore, this Court does not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal. 
However, Fredrickson Defendants failed to raise the issue of an untimely appeal on a 
motion for summary disposition. Rule 10 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
allows a party to move to dismiss the appeal on the basis that the appellate court lacks 
jurisdiction. Utah R. App. P. 10(a)(1). Over one year has passed since the Mojo 
Plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal. Many months have passed since Mojo Plaintiffs' 
current counsel appeared. Both sides have incurred costs and fees in briefing the appeal. 
If the appeal is deemed untimely, the Fredrickson Defendants should have raised the issue 
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prior to any briefing on appeal and it would have saved both sides time and fees. Just as 
the Utah Supreme Court has recognized, "[i]t is well settled that issues raised by an 
appellant in the reply brief that were not preserved in the opening brief are considered 
waived and will not be considered by the appellate court.M Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, ^  
8, 194 P.3d 903. The same reasoning applies here. Fredrickson Defendants should have 
raised the issue prior to their Opposition Brief. In any event, if this Court determines the 
Mojo Plaintiffs1 appeal is untimely, this Court should not award either side its costs and 
fees on appeal. 
B. The Mojo Plaintiffs's Notice of Appeal is Timely under Rule 58A 
and the Record is Clear the Mojo Plaintiffs Always Intended to 
Appeal the Trial Court's Summary Judgment Ruling. 
The Fredrickson Defendants argue Mojo Plaintiffs failed to file a timely notice of 
appeal and, even if the notice of appeal were timely filed, the Mojo Plaintiffs did not file 
a sufficient motion to set aside the summary judgment ruling under Rule 59 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure to toll the time period to file a notice of appeal. However, the 
notice of appeal was timely filed and the record is clear the Mojo Plaintiffs always 
intended to appeal the trial court's summary judgment ruling. 
Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires a party to file Notice of 
Appeal within 30 days of die final judgment or order. See Utah R. Civ. P. 4(a). Rule 
58A(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states, "all judgments shall be signed by the 
judge and filed with the clerk." Utah R. Civ. P. 58A(b) (2011). Further, Rule 58A 
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continues, "[a] judgment is complete and shall be deemed entered for all purposes, except 
the creation of a lien on real property, when it is signed and filed as provided in 
paragraphs (a) or (b). The clerk shall immediately record the judgment in the register of 
actions and the register of judgments." Utah R. Civ. P. 58(c). 
First, the Mojo Plaintiffs timely filed a Notice of Appeal pursuant to Rule 58A. 
After the trial court entered its order on summary judgment ruling, the Mojo Plaintiffs 
filed a motion to set aside the summary judgment ruling. On or about August 29, 2011, 
the trial court signed a minute entry, which constituted a final order, denying the Mojo 
Plaintiffs' motion to set aside the summary judgment ruling. The order was entered on 
the trial court's docket on August 30, 2011, and mailed by the trial court's clerk on August 
30, 2011. As of August 30, 2011, the Minute Entry was a final, appealable order because 
it was signed and entered as required under Rule 5 8A. Thirty days thereafter, on 
September 29, 2011, counsel for Mojo Plaintiffs filed their Notice of Appeal. Therefore, 
the Notice of Appeal was timely filed. 
Second, the Mojo Plaintiffs' motion to set aside the summary judgment ruling was 
sufficient for the trial court to rule upon. The Fredrickson Defendants argue the Mojo 
Plaintiffs' notice of appeal was not timely because the Mojo Plaintiffs did not file an 
adequate Rule 59(a) motion. Fredrickson Defendants cite to BAM. Development, LLC 
v. Salt Lake County, 2012 UT 26, — P.3d — to support their argument. However, 
Fredrickson Defendants' argument is flawed for two reasons. First, the Mojo Plaintiffs 
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should not be held to a standard when the case law was not in existence at the time the 
motion to set aside the summary judgment ruling was filed. The Mojo Plaintiffs filed 
their motion to set aside the summary judgment ruling on July 26, 2011. The BAM. 
Development case was not decided until May 4, 2012, nearly one year after the Mojo 
Plaintiffs filed their motion. Therefore, the BAM. Development is inapplicable. Second, 
the Mojo Plaintiffs' motion to set aside the summary judgment ruling was adequate for 
the trial court to issue a decision. The motion to set aside the summary judgment ruling 
cited to Utah R. Civ. P. 59 and 60 and case law, such as Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n v. 
Ultrasystems W. Constructors, Inc., 767 P,.2d 125 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), and requested 
relief from the summary judgment ruling. (R. 1923-29.) In its Minute Entry, the trial 
court ruled on the motion and identified that Mojo Plaintiffs cited to Utah R. Civ. P. 59 
and 60. (R. 2104-07.) Though the trial court found there was insufficient analysis on 
which to set aside the summary judgment ruling, it did not dismiss the motion for failure 
to comply with Utah R. Civ. P. 59 and 60. Therefore, Fredrickson Defendants' argument 
is baseless. 
Last, even if this Court determines the notice of appeal was not filed with 30 days 
of entry of the Minute Entry, the Mojo Plaintiffs always intended to appeal the trial 
court's summary judgment ruling. After the trial court entered its summary judgment 
ruling, on February 7, 2011, the Mojo Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal. However, the 
trial court had not issued a final order, as the trial court reserved the issue of attorney fees 
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and counsel for Mojo Plaintiffs filed a motion to set aside the summary judgment ruling. 
A per curium decision by this Court, issued on May 11, 2011, states that the appeal is 
dismissed without prejudice to timely file an appeal from a final order. Thereafter, 
jurisdiction was transferred to the trial court to issue a decision on the attorney fees and to 
rule on the Mojo Plaintiffs' motion to set aside the summary judgment ruling. Thereafter, 
On August 30, the trial court issued its ruling on the attorney fees and the Mojo Plaintiffs' 
motion to set aside the summary judgment ruling. On September 29, 2011, the Mojo 
Plaintiffs timely filed a second Notice of Appeal. The Mojo Plaintiffs filed two notices of 
appeal and always intended to appeal the trial court's summary judgment ruling. 
Therefore, the Mojo Plaintiffs1 appeal should not be dismissed. 
II. This Court Should Reverse the Trial Court's Summary Judgment 
Dismissal because Mr. Brown's Conduct Rose to the Level of 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. 
Fredrickson Defendants argue the ineffective assistance of counsel does not apply 
in the civil context and, even if it did, Mojo Plaintiffs cannot show that Mr. Brown's 
counsel was ineffective. They cite to Chilton v. Young, 2009 UT App 265 for the 
proposition that ineffective assistance of counsel does not apply in the civil context. 
However, what Chilton and its predecessors acknowledge is the "general rule" that there 
is no constitutional right to effective representation in civil matters. See Chilton, supra; 
see also Rukavina v. Triatlantic Ventures, Inc., 931 P.2d 122, 126 (Utah 1997); Jennings 
v. Stoker, 652 P.2d 912 (Utah 1982). However, the Utah Supreme Court has noted that 
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,f[t]here are cases which recognize that under exigent or exceptional circumstances which 
appear to have resulted in an injustice, the court may be justified in granting a new trial." 
Jennings, 652 P.2d at 913. 
In the concurring opinion in Malthy v. Cox Const Co., Inc., 598 P.2d 336 (Utah 
1979), Chief Justice Crockett acknowledged, "[t]he purpose of all court proceedings is, of 
course, to do justice. If the processes have so clearly gone awry that an injustice has 
resulted, the court in charge of the trial, or this Court on review, should rectify such an 
unfortunate occurrence, whether the proceeding is criminal or civil." Id. at 341 
(concurring opinion of Crockett, J. J., and concurred by Hall and Stewart). Chief Justice 
Crockett continued that, in his view, "determining whether relief should be granted the 
matter of critical concern should not be as to the nature of the proceeding, but whether 
there is such a strong likelihood that an injustice has resulted that good conscience 
' requires it to be remedied." Id. at 342. 
Here, the Mojo Plaintiffs' case is one of the "exigent circumstances" warranting a 
reversal of the trial court's summary judgment dismissal because Mr. Brown's counsel 
was ineffective. As detailed in Mojo Plaintiffs' Opening Brief on Appeal, Mr. Brown's 
counsel was ineffective by his failures to comply with Rules 7 and 56 in responding to 
Fredrickson Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, (R. 1393-97; 1738-43); failing 
to serve documents upon opposing counsel, (R. 1328-29; 1393-94); and, failing to comply 
with the Rules of Civil Procedure in motion practice, (R. 1326-27; 1394-95). Ultimately, 
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the trial court ruled that because Mr. Brown failed to follow the Rules of Civil Procedure 
in responding to the motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs case should be dismissed. 
Had Mr. Brown followed the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial court likely would 
not have granted summary judgment and would have allowed the case to proceed to trial. 
See Kell v. State, 2008 UT 62, f 48, 194 P.3d 913 (noting that summary judgment is a 
"drastic remedy"). 
Additionally, at the time he was representing Mojo Plaintiffs, Mr. Brown was 
involved in suspicious activities with home mortgage modifications and investigated by 
the FBI. Further, the Office of Professional Conduct filed an administrative action 
against Mr. Brown and his license was placed on "disability" status. See In Re Discipline 
ofTrujillo, 2011 UT 38, \ 25, 24 P.3d 972 ("An attorneys disability status derives from a 
'physical or mental condition which adversely affects the lawyer's ability to practice 
law[.]f" (citing RLDD 23(c) (superseded by Supreme Court Rules of Professional 
Practice, ch. 14, art. 5, Rule 14-523)). 
Mr. Brown's conduct was not "irregular" as Fredrickson Defendants argue. The 
trial court acknowledged Mr. Brown's numerous and faulty filings and penalized the 
Mojo Plaintiffs for his conduct by awarding the Fredrickson Defendants with attorney 
fees. (R. 1906.) Further, the trial court acknowledged Mr. Brown did not comply with 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, granted summary judgment in favor of Fredrickson 
Defendants, and dismissed the case. (R. 1738-1743; 2125, Tr., 43:1-5.) Even Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Fredrickson Defendants acknowledge the trial court granted summary judgment based on 
Mr. Brown's failure to comply with Rules 7 and 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
See Appellees' Brief, p. 22. Mr. Brown's conduct fell woefully below the standard of 
reasonable care and prejudiced the Mojo Plaintiffs. Therefore, this case presents an 
exigent circumstance where reversal is proper based on Mr. Brown's ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
III. Alternatively, this Court Should Reverse the Trial Court's Dismissal on 
Summary Judgment because the Mojo Plaintiffs Substantially 
Complied with Rules 7 and 56 to Show Genuine Issues of Material 
Fact. 
Fredrickson Defendants argue the standard of review to apply in this case is abuse 
of discretion. Mojo Plaintiffs disagree and argue this court should apply a "correctness" 
standard of review. Under either standard of review, the trial court's dismissal on 
summary judgment must be reversed because the Mojo Plaintiffs substantially complied 
with Utah R. Civ. P. 7 and 56. 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs summary judgment and 
requires "[t]he motion, memoranda, and affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7 [of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure]." Id. at 56(c) (2011). Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure requires an opposing memorandum to contain "a verbatim restatement of 
each of the moving party's facts that is controverted," as well as an explanation of the 
grounds for the dispute and citations to relevant materials. Id. at 7(c)(3)(B). While "the 
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trial court has discretion in requiring compliance with [rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure]," Bluffdale City v. Smith, 2007 UT App 25, f 5, 156 P.3d 175 (second 
alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted), strict compliance under Rule 7 
is not necessary if the failure to comply with Rule 7 was harmless error, Salt Lake County 
v. Metro West Ready Mix, Inc., 2004 UT 23, n. 4, 89 P.3d 155. 
Fredrickson Defendants argue the Mojo Plaintiffs1 Second Opposition 
Memorandum was noncompliant with Rule 7 because: (1) the factual assertions are not 
"quoted verbatim," (2) the explanation of disputes was a series of "unanswered rhetorical 
questions," (3) the citations to supporting materials refer to documents provided by the 
Fredrickson Defendants and demonstrate no dispute, and (4) the citations do not contain 
sufficient pinpoint citations. See Appellees1 Brief, pp. 23-24. However, Fredrickson 
Defendants'argument is unavailing. 
First, the Mojo Plaintiffs quoted verbatim the Fredrickson Defendants' facts that 
were in dispute. Rule 7 only requires a verbatim restatement of the facts that are in 
dispute. See Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(B) (emphasis added). The Mojo Plaintiffs did just 
that. They cited to the facts that were controverted in the "Statement of Facts" section 
and within the body of the memorandum. (R. 1425-1441.) Therefore, the first 
requirement of Rule 7 is met. 
Second, the Mojo Plaintiffs provided an explanation of the disputed issues, as well 
as citations to supporting materials. While the Second Opposition Memorandum does Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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entertain certain questions, these questions raise genuine issues of material fact. The 
Second Opposition Memorandum raises the issue of (1) whether Fredrickson Defendants 
provided a full accounting of the $40,000 to Judith and Mark Peterson, (R. 1432, | 10); 
(2) whether the Fredrickson Defendants were responsible to pay the taxes for a Bar 
Named Sue, (R. 1432-33, | 12); (3) whether Mark Peterson under-reported the second 
quarter sales for Bar Named Sue or was involved in wrongful conduct relating to Bar 
Named Sue, (R. 1433-34, % 14); (4) whether Mojo Plaintiffs wanted to sell the Bar to 
Fredrickson Defendants, (R. 1437, f 20-22); (5) whether Mojo Plaintiffs were represented 
by counsel in the Asset Purchase Agreement, (R. 1437, f 20-22); and (6) whether 
Fredrickson Defendants made promises of partnership after the signing of the Asset 
Purchase Agreement and subsequent documents, (R. 1479, fflj 31-32, 1561, fflf 22-23, 
1505, ]f 27). Further, Mojo Plaintiffs provided the trial court with documentary evidence, 
including the Certificates of Agency Authority and of Resolution, (R. 1452-53), the 
acknowledgment of Fredrickson's 50 percent ownership in Bar Named Sue, (R. 1468), the 
Affidavit of John Bates, (R. 1469-71), the Second Affidavit of Judith Peterson, (R. 1475-
80), a blank promissory note, (R. 1481), the Second Affidavit of Mark Peterson, (R. 
1501-07), and the Affidavit of Mark Peterson, (R. 1558-62). 
The Mojo Plaintiffs' Second Opposition Memorandum complied with Utah R. Civ. 
P. 7 and 56. The Mojo Plaintiffs provided a restatement of the facts in dispute, as well as 
citations to other documentary proof, including affidavits and documents. The Mojo 
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Plaintiffs substantially complied with Rule 7 and, therefore, the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment based on noncompliance with Rules 7 and 56 was in error and should 
be reversed. 
IV. This Court Should Reverse the Trial Court's Grant of Summary 
Judgment because Fredrickson Defendants' Promises to Mark 
Peterson Regarding Ownership in the Bar Create Genuine Issues of 
Material Fact. 
Fredrickson Defendants argue summary judgment was appropriate because there 
are no disputed issued of fact relating to any of the five claims in Mojo Plaintiffs 
complaint. However, a review of the record shows that there are genuine issues of fact 
that preclude summary judgment on any of the claims. To overcome summary judgment, 
Mojo Plaintiffs only need to "offer at least some evidence that could be interpreted to 
satisfy the elements of the claim...." Waddoups v., Amalgamated Sugar Co., 2002 UT 
69, T[ 35, 54 P.3d 1054. Each of these claims should be presented at trial. 
A. As to the First Cause of Action for Rescission Based upon 
Breach and Fraud, Genuine Issues of Fact Exist as to Whether 
Fredrickson Defendants Verbally Modified the Asset Purchase 
Agreement and Whether Mojo Plaintiffs had Counsel in 
Connection with the Alleged Sale. 
Fredrickson Defendants argue the "undisputed evidence'1 shows the Fredrickson 
Defendants did not verbally modify the Asset Purchase agreement, the "undisputed 
evidence" show Mojo Plaintiffs received legal counsel, and the "undisputed evidence" 
shows that Mojo Plaintiffs receive the payments required under the Asset Purchase 
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Agreement. See Appellees1 Brief, pp. 29-34. However, the evidence on the record is 
disputed and shows disputed issues of fact. 
First, the evidence is disputed as to whether the Fredrickson Defendants verbally 
modified the Asset Purchase Agreement by making verbal promises to Mojo Plaintiffs 
and Mark and Judith Peterson. Specifically, in her second affidavit, Judith Peterson 
stated, "[o]n October 27, 2009, [Fredrickson] came to my home with an Asset Purchase 
Agreement that he had already drafted," (R. 1478, \ 21), and "John had myself and Mark 
sign the agreement at my dining room table," (R. 1479, f^ 28). Judith Peterson's testimony 
continues, "John Fredrickson never mentioned that I was selling the bar. I was only 
selling my half of the bar. Mark was keeping his half of the bar and was to be partners 
with John Fredrickson." (R. 1479, ffij 31-32.) Judith Peterson's second affidavit lists the 
events in chronological order. According to her testimony, the Asset Purchase 
Agreement was signed and then Fredrickson made the verbal promises. The Affidavit of 
Mark Peterson and Second Affidavit of Mark Peterson are substantially similar. (R. 
1504-05, ffif 24-27; 1561, ffli 22-23, 1505, \ 27.) This creates a genuine issue of material 
fact. The record is not "undisputed" as Fredrickson Defendants allege. In fact, this is a 
dispute over a genuine issue of material fact relating to the rescission claim. Therefore, 
summary judgment was inappropriate. 
Second, the evidence is disputed whether Mojo Plaintiffs were represented by legal 
counsel in connection with the Asset Purchase Agreement. The Affidavit of John Bates 
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raises the issue that the Mojo Plaintiffs were not represented by counsel in connection 
with the Asset Purchase Agreement and subsequent documents. (R. 1470/|j 6.) Mr. Bates 
disclaims any representation of Mojo Plaintiffs during that time period, though 
acknowledges that he reviewed a few documents and gave his comments. (R. 1470, ^ f 6.) 
Notwithstanding his review, he stated the review was limited and the comments were 
forwarded to Fredrickson Defendants' attorney. (R. 1471, j^ 8.) Never did Mr. Bates 
represent the Mojo Plaintiffs, communicate with the Mojo Plaintiffs, or provide legal 
advice to Mojo Plaintiffs relating to the Asset Purchase Agreement. Mark Peterson 
confirms that they were not represented by legal counsel. (R. 1504, ^  24.) This creates a 
genuine issue of fact as to whether the Mojo Plaintiffs were represented by counsel for 
the Asset Purchase Agreement and subsequent documents. Certainly, if neither the 
attorney nor the alleged client believe there was representation, then no representation 
occurred. See Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 2001 UT 107,1f 40, 37 P.3d 1130 
("[T]he proper determination of whether an implied attorney-client relationship exists 
hinges on whether the party had a reasonable belief \haX it was represented." (alteration in 
original).) 
Third, it is disputed whether Mojo Plaintiffs received and accepted the monthly 
payments under the promissory note and Asset Purchase Agreement. While Fredrickson 
Defendants argue the evidence is "undisputed" and the parties signed the Closing 
Memorandum, evidence on the record again demonstrates genuine issues of fact. For 
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example, Mark Peterson stated there was no accounting of the $40,000, (R. 1504, ^ 22) 
and testified in his deposition that Fredrickson never gave an accounting and represented, 
"he was taking care of it," (R. 1499, 145:4-146:23). In fact, Mark Peterson testified 
Fredrickson said he was "taking care of it" at the time the Closing Memorandum was 
signed. (Id at 146:20-23.) It is disputed whether Fredrickson promised to provide an 
accounting. This creates a genuine issue of material fact, which prevented summary 
judgment. Therefore, the trial court's decision should be reversed. 
B. As to the Second Cause of Action for Intentional Interference 
with Prospective Economic Relations, Genuine Issues of Material 
Fact Exist as to Whether Fredrickson Defendants Made 
Promises to Mojo Plaintiffs Regarding Mark Peterson's 
Ownership in the Bar. 
Fredrickson Defendants argue the trial court correctly concluded that there is no 
evidence in the record that Fredrickson Defendants had an improper purpose or exercised 
improper means to take the bar and its assets from Mojo Plaintiffs. Fredrickson 
Defendants allege the undisputed evidence demonstrates that "Mojo Plaintiffs agreed to 
sell the barfs assets to the Fredrickson Defendants for $80,000.00 and that the Fredrickson 
Defendants tendered an agreed payment." See Appellees' Brief, p. 38. However, as 
discussed above, there aire genuine issues of fact regarding Fredrickson Defendants1 
promises to Mojo Plaintiffs regarding Mark Peterson's ownership of the bar. 
First, as discussed in Section IV.A. above, there are genuine issues of fact as to 
whether the Fredrickson Defendants made promises to Mark Peterson about ownership of 
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the bar. (R. 782-83; 1505.) According to Judith Peterson's second affidavit, listing 
events in chronological order, Fredrickson made these promises after signing the Asset 
Purchase Agreement. (R. 1479, ff 31-32.) This is a genuine issue of fact. Second, it is a 
disputed fact whether the Mojo Plaintiffs intended to sell the bar at all. According to 
Judith Peterson's second affidavit, she believed she was only selling her share of the bar 
to Fredrickson Defendants and that Mark Peterson would be a partner with Fredrickson. 
(R. 1479, ffif 31-32.) This is another genuine issue of material fact. Third, if Judith 
Peterson, not Mojo Plaintiffs, owned the assets of the bar, then Fredrickson Defendants 
could not have purchased the assets. Though Fredrickson Defendants argue Mojo 
Plaintiffs should be estopped from this argument, this would be an issue ripe for trial. 
Fredrickson Defendants also argue Judith Peterson signed the Asset Purchase Agreement; 
however, the signature was as "secretary" on behalf of Mojo Syndicate, Inc. (R. 1549.) 
Therefore, if she owned the assets personally, the Fredrickson Defendants could not have 
purchased the assets. These facts are material and go to the heart of the issue whether 
Fredrickson Defendants used an improper purpose to induce a mentally unsound woman 
to allegedly sell the assets of the bar to them. (R. 1482.) Therefore, the trial court erred 
in granting summary judgment and dismissing this claim. 
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C. As to the Third Cause of Action for Civil Conspiracy, Genuine 
Issues of Fact as to Whether Fredrickson Defendants Made 
Verbal Promises to Mojo Plaintiff Regarding Mark Peterson's 
Ownership of the Bar. 
Fredrickson Defendants argue the claim for civil conspiracy fails because there is 
nothing unlawful or wrongful with signing the Asset Purchase Agreement, or with selling 
the bar for the $805000 agreed-upon purchase price. See Appellees1 Brief, pp. 38-39. 
However, as discussed in IV.A. and IV.B. above, there are genuine issues of fact relating 
to Fredrickson Defendants* conduct and the trial court should not have granted summary 
judgment. Mojo Plaintiffs provided evidence that Fredrickson Defendants obtained the 
assets through the Asset Purchase Agreement, while making verbal promises to Mark 
Peterson and Judith Peterson that they would keep Mark Peterson as a partner in the bar. 
(R. 1479, ffii 31-32.) Fredrickson Defendants purchased the bar for $80,000, when the 
evidence shows the sales for the second quarter of the bar were at least $232,837.90. (R. 
758-59, Vol. I, 91:19-92:17.) These create genuine issues of fact as to whether 
Fredrickson Defendants conspired to obtain the assets of the bar using unlawful means or 
wrongful purpose. Certainly, making false promises to purchase something for far less 
than its value is an unlawful means or wrongful purpose. These genuine issues of fact 
preclude summary judgment. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment and the 
decision should be reversed. 
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D. As to the Fourth Cause of Action for Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 
Genuine Issues of Material Fact Exist as to Whether Fredrickson 
Owed a Fiduciary Duty to Mojo Plaintiffs and Whether Such a 
Duty was Breached. 
Fredrickson Defendants argue the trial court correctly found that there was no 
fiduciary duty owed to Mojo Plaintiffs after the execution of the Asset Purchase 
Agreement and, even if a fiduciary duty continued during negotiation and execution of 
the Asset Purchase Agreement, "the only thing that the Mojo Plaintiffs claim Fredrickson 
did to breach his alleged duty was to fail to inform them of his conduct." See Appellees' 
Brief, p. 41. However, genuine issues of material fact exist to whether Fredrickson owed 
fiduciary duties to Mojo Plaintiffs and whether he breached those duties. 
Mojo Plaintiffs and Fredrickson signed an agreement on October 2, 2009, wherein 
Fredrickson would assume "50 per cent [sic] control, ownership, and assigned shares of 
MOJO SYNDICATE INC., and A BAR NAMED SUE LLC." (R. 815.) Though not 
specifically titled a "partnership agreement," Fredrickson owed fiduciary duties to Mojo 
Plaintiffs (and Mark and Judith Peterson) as he owned 50 percent of the bar. He was 
required to provide accounting records of any money he put into the bar for repairs 
(which he claims is $40,000), (R. 489, TJ13), and inform them of his plans not to make 
Mark Peterson a partner in the new venture, (R. 490, % 17). These are material facts 
which are in dispute. If Fredrickson had a fiduciary duty to Mojo Plaintiffs, then he was 
required to disclose information to Mojo Plaintiffs. He failed to do so. Instead, according 
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to Judith and Mark Peterson, he represented that Mark Peterson would be his partner in 
the bar. (R. 1479, ffl| 31-32; 1561, ffif 22-23, 1505, ^  27.) According to Judith Peterson, 
after signing the Asset Purchase Agreement, Fredrickson represented he wanted Mark 
Peterson to be his partner. That is enough to form a partnership. The trial court erred in 
granting summary judgment because a fiduciary duty has attendant obligations, which 
were breached if Fredrickson had a fiduciary duty to Mojo Plaintiffs. This issue should 
have proceeded to trial. 
E. As to the Fifth Cause of Action for Breach of Contracts, Genuine 
Issues of Fact Exist as to Whether Fredrickson Verbally 
Modified the Asset Purchase Agreement and Breached the 
Contract. 
Fredrickson Defendants argue there is no evidence of breach of contract because 
the terms of the fully executed Asset Purchase Agreement are clear and there is no 
provision that requires an accounting from Fredrickson in the Asset Purchase Agreement 
or Closing Memorandum. See Appellees' Brief, pp. 42-44. However, the trial court's 
dismissal of the breach of contract claim was error because genuine issues of fact exist as 
to whether the Asset Purchase Agreement was verbally modified by Fredrickson 
Defendants after it was signed and, if so, whether Fredrickson Defendants breached that 
contract. 
As discussed in Section IV.A. above, Mojo Plaintiffs raised the issue of whether 
Fredrickson verbally modified the Asset Purchase Agreement. Both Judith Petersonfs and 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Mark Peterson's second affidavits raise the issue that Fredrickson was planning to keep 
Mark Peterson as a partner with him. (R. 1479, fflf 31-32; 1561, ffif 22-23, 1505, ]f 27.) 
Mojo Plaintiffs also raised the issue of whether Fredrickson contracted to pay Judith 
Peterson "$2,000.00 a month and $3,000.00 a month to Mark Peterson under the table and 
$40,000.00 up front for partnership in the bar, which he did not do." (R. 1272, ^  27.) It is 
unclear when Fredrickson made this promise, but if the promise was made and 
Fredrickson failed to make the payments to Mark Peterson and full payments to Judith 
Peterson, then that is a breach of contract. Further, Mojo Plaintiffs raised the issue that 
Fredrickson Defendants did not provide any evidence of payment in full and never 
provided an accounting of the $40,000 "credit" Fredrickson Defendants received in the 
Asset Purchase Agreement. (R. 1498-99.) Again, it is unclear when this promise was 
made. However, if Fredrickson Defendants promised to provide an accounting after the 
Asset Purchase Agreement was signed or after the Closing Memorandum was signed and 
never did, then that is a breach of the contract. The fact that these promises were made at 
all prevent summary judgment. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment when 
Mojo Plaintiffs raised these issues and they were never investigated. These are genuine 
issues of fact preventing summary judgment. Therefore, this Court should reverse the 
summary judgment ruling and allow this case to proceed to trial. 
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V. This Court Should Reverse the Trial Court's Award of Attorney Fees 
because Summary Judgment was Inappropriate and the Amount of 
Fees was Unreasonable. 
Fredrickson Defendants argue the standard of review on appeal is correctness and 
abuse of discretion. See Appellees' Brief, pp. 44-45. Fredrickson Defendants also argue 
Mojo Plaintiffs never preserved their argument that Fredrickson Defendants are not 
entitled to an award of attorney fees and, in any event, the amount of fees was reasonable. 
Id. at pp. 45-47. However, Fredrickson Defendants misunderstand Mojo Plaintiffs' 
argument. 
First, the trial court erred in awarding Fredrickson Defendants attorney fees at all 
in connection with this catse because summary judgment was inappropriate. As discussed 
in Section IV above, the grant of summary judgment was error because there are genuine 
issues of material fact that prevent summary judgment on each of the five causes of 
action. Logically, it follows that if the grant of summary judgment was error, then the 
award of attorney fees was also error. Therefore, this Court should reverse the attorney 
fee award. 
Second, the trial court's award of attorney fees under the Asset Purchase 
Agreement was error. Fredrickson Defendants do not even respond to this argument and, 
instead, argue the issue was never preserved in the record below. Mojo Plaintiffs 
preserved the issue in the Mojo Plaintiffs, Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants 
3928 LLC's Motion and Memorandum for Attorneys' Fees and Costs, wherein Mojo 
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Plaintiffs "pray that the Court not grant attorneys fees or at least substantially reduce 
them." (R. 1808.) In the reply memorandum, Fredrickson Defendants dedicated an entire 
page to the argument that they are entitled to attorney fees under the purchase agreement. 
(R. 1819.) The issue was preserved for review by this Court. Given that the issue was 
preserved and the Fredrickson Defendants failed to address the issue, leaving it 
unopposed, this Court should reverse on this basis. 
In any event, the trial court erred in awarding Fredrickson Defendants all of the 
attorney fees, as there were five causes of action and only two causes of action dealt with 
the Asset Purchase Agreement. (R. 1-10.) The second, third, and fourth causes of action 
have no bearing on the Asset Purchase Agreement and did not require the trial court to 
"interpret or enforce" the Agreement. These allegations involved conduct separate and 
apart from the Agreement. Therefore, the award of attorney fees was error and should be 
reversed. 
Third, the trial court's award of attorney fees was not reasonable. Fredrickson 
Defendants argue the lawsuit was to enforce the provisions of the Asset Purchase 
Agreement, that 3928 LLC was the prevailing party, and the fees were reasonable. 
However, the fees were unreasonable because the fees incurred in responding to simple 
motions was absurd. Fredrickson Defendants do not even respond to the amounts of fees 
expended in the case. For instance, Fredrickson Defendants requested $19,617.00 in fees 
for "Defendants1 Motions for Preliminary Injunction, to Amend Complaint, and for 
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Appointment of a Receiver." (R. 1846-48; 1859.) Nearly 1/3 of all fees incurred was due 
to these responses. The trial court acknowledged the issues were "settled after all 
pleadings had been filed." (R. 1906.) The trial court erred in awarding these fees when 
the issue was settled and the Court acknowledged the settlement. 
Additionally, the time for discovery was $16,347.75, but only two depositions 
were taken and Fredrickson Defendants did not produce any documents requested by 
Mojo Plaintiffs. (R. 1704-05; 1848-1851; 1859.) This amounts to 1/4 of the fees incurred 
in the case. A fee of over $16,000 for two depositions and slight discovery is not 
reasonable. Lastly, the award of $17,962.25 in attorney fees in connection with the 
motion for summary judgment is not reasonable. As examined in Mojo Plaintiffs' 
Opening Brief on Appeal, Counsel for Fredrickson Defendants spent 32.75 hours, or 
$6,526.25, in drafting the motion for summary judgment, (R. 1853-54), and 22.25 hours, 
or $4,566.25, in drafting the reply memorandum, (R. 1854-55). Counsel for Fredrickson 
Defendants also spent 18.4 hours, or $3,808.50, in preparing for and attending the 
summary judgment hearing, which was only one hour. This award is unreasonable. The 
fee was unreasonable and inappropriate, in light of the fact that there were genuine issues 
of material fact that prevented the entry of summary judgment. 
Lastly, this Court should not award Fredrickson Defendants their attorney fees on 
appeal. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment and in awarding attorney fees 
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below because there are genuine issues of material fact that require this case to proceed to 
trial. Therefore, an award of attorney fees on appeal is not proper. 
CONCLUSION 
Pursuant to the foregoing arguments and law, Appellants Mojo Syndicate, Inc., 
and Bar Named Sue, LLC, respectfully request this Court reverse the Third District Court 
summary judgment ruling and award of attorney fees, and remand to the trial court for a 
trial on the merits. 
DATED this Vb day of September, 2012. 
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN 
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Daniel B. Garriott 
Tahnee L. Hamilton 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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